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Abstract 
Based on a letter book of the London Baltic merchant Michael 
Mitford dating 1703-1707 this paper argues that the ability of 
merchant networks to secure property rights in long distance 
trade must be re-evaluated. Contrary to the argument of the 
New Institutional Economists, these were not inferior to the 
nation state in facilitating the expansion of trade and thereby 
Smithean growth. It is shown that Mitford's network did not 
limit membership by non-economic criteria but adapted to the 
needs of trade. It efficiently solved the free-rider problem 
through a reputation mechanism. As social ties developed 
parallel to business ties, the shadow of the future was 
furthermore supported by the threat of ostracism from the 
community and helped maintain agents' honesty. Members 
shared a common set of values, including reciprocity, which 
played an important role in their conduct of business. The 
network's attempts at expansion were, however, of limited 
success. This is related to mercantilist policies and ongoing 
warfare in the region, not to the network's lacking ability. 
Furthermore it is shown that the network provided the 
members with contacts and business opportunities and 
thereby supported their business activities more than political 
institutions did. The expansion of the nation state actually 
hindered rather than supported the expansion of trade in the 
Northern Seas. 
 
 
1. The Question 
 According to the New Institutional Economists, it was the expansion 
of the centralised state in the early modern period that enabled long term 
intensive growth. Until then trade had been predominantly organised by 
voluntary organisations, i.e. merchant networks. These however faced 
high transaction costs that limited the expansion of trade and thereby 
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growth. This meant that answering basic requirements of trade, such as 
collecting information and securing property rights,  demanded time, effort 
and funds.1 The incentive to participate in trade depended on the degree 
of these costs. Some of these costs, such as information gathering, were 
fixed and subject to economies of scale. Knowledge of prices, the security 
situation in a region of interest to merchants, and information about 
agents had to be gathered independently from the volume of trade. If the 
volume of goods and the number of participants in the trade grew, the 
costs per capita shrank.2 Hence, merchants had an interest in a large 
market with as many participants as possible.  
 However, networks have to deal with the free rider problem. For 
Mancur Olson, the provision of public goods for their members is the 
fundamental function of organisations.3 They face a major problem: even 
if all members of the group share a common goal or interest and would all 
profit from achieving this goal, this does not automatically mean that each 
individual will direct their actions towards this goal. The problem with 
public goods is that once they are provided, it is difficult to exclude people 
from using them. Hence the incentive to contribute to the provision of the 
public good is low. The option to use the good without contributing to its 
provision is very attractive. Olson claims that, in general, small groups are 
more capable of organising themselves and providing the public good 
than are large groups. Merchant networks faced this problem regarding 
the public goods of property rights and information. In order to secure 
these, i.e. protect the public good, they had to limit membership of the 
network. Members were chosen for non-trade related reasons, like 
                                                 
1 North, D. C. (1991): Institutions, transaction costs, and the rise of merchant empires, 
in Tracy, J.D. (Ed.): The political economy of merchant empires, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp.22-40. 
2 North, D.C. and Thomas R.P. (1973): The rise of the Western world, London: 
Cambridge University Press, p.93. 
3 Olson, M. (1971): The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of 
groups, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press. 
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belonging to a certain community, based on criteria such as ethnicity, or 
faith, in the hope that this would ensure loyalty and make control easier. 
This was necessary to secure property rights, the basic requirement for 
long distance trade. 
 The state, in contrast, was able to lower transaction costs, as it 
allowed larger numbers of people to join the market. It could do so 
through its monopoly of force. This monopoly enabled it to tax all subjects 
in return for supplying a judiciary and enforcing property rights. It thereby 
solved the free rider problem more efficiently, and enabled a higher 
degree of expansion of the market. More participants to the market meant 
that transaction costs were split among more individuals thus lowering 
transaction costs per capita. These factors meant that the state enabled 
economic growth better than voluntary groups. The development of such 
states in Europe before anywhere else is meant to explain the rise of the 
West.4 
 However, research in non-European Economic History in recent 
years has shown that, up to the 18th century, similar economic 
developments may have occurred in regions that lacked centralised 
states. In recent years, the California School has argued that China was 
economically on par with Europe until at least 1750, in spite of a 
centralised state being almost non-existent there.5 The Qing Empire, they 
argue, witnessed intensive growth based on the expansion of trade, 
which in turn was conducted by merchant networks.6 If this is indeed true, 
it seems fair to ask whether the ability of voluntary groups to lower 
                                                 
4 North, D.C. and Thomas R.P. (1973): The rise of the Western world, London: 
Cambridge University Press. 
5 Vries, P.(2002): Governing growth: A comparative analysis of the role of the state in 
the rise of the West, Journal of World History, 12, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
pp.67-138. 
6 Pomeranz, K.(2000): The great divergence, Europe,  Asia and the making of the 
modern world economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Bin Wong, R. (1997): 
China transformed. Historical change and the limits of European experience, Ithaka: 
Cornell University Press. 
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transaction costs, secure property rights and facilitate growth needs to be 
re-evaluated. 
 In this paper I will examine the network of the London merchant 
Michael Mitford, using copies of his letters written between 1703-1707. 
My hypothesis is that his network was not inferior to a state in facilitating 
trade expansion. It dealt with free riders efficiently and did not limit the 
size of its market according to non-trade related criteria. Instead it was a 
cosmopolitan construct, flexible in its conduct of trade. It adapted to the 
needs of trade regarding membership, geographical destination, and 
commodities. It was therefore not an inferior institution, but facilitated 
trade most efficiently. 
 
 
2. The Literature 
 There are two main approaches to the subject of early modern 
merchant networks in the literature. One is historical, the other new 
institutional. The historical literature is mostly descriptive. It restricts itself 
to general statements on the importance of group identity and solidarity. 
Membership of a special community or family provided shared ethics and 
values which enabled business partners to trust one another without the 
possibility of direct control. However, few details regarding mechanisms of 
credit enforcement and securing of property rights are given. 
 This gap has prompted research by the New Institutional 
Economists, most importantly North, Landa, and Greif. The former argues 
that long distance trade was limited by high transaction costs, the latter 
employing game theory to explain the fundamental role of reputation 
mechanisms in its conduct. 
 The research covers most parts of the world, from East Asia over 
Central Africa to the Atlantic. Even though the way long distance trade 
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was conducted varied from place to place, a high degree of similarities 
can be observed.  
 The most important element in long distance trade is that of 
diaspora. Merchants were often found at the margins of society. They 
might be foreigners, either because their profession demanded settlement 
abroad, or because a migratory background enabled participation in 
trade. Otherwise they might belong to a religious or ethnic minority, which 
enabled them to conduct business between cultures.  
 Ties of family and community functioned as an additional control 
force, as they existed parallel to business relationships. Moreover, 
cheating in business would lead to the severing of social ties.  Where the 
possible loss of business contacts is not sufficient, the threat of ostracism 
served as an additional incentive for honesty.  
 Regarding the historical literature, the networks it describes are 
usually based on either family or religion/ethnicity. A few cases combine 
the two. 
 An example for long distance trade along family lines is given by 
Bratchel, who describes the organisation of Italian companies trading in 
London in the 16th century. These used relatives as agents abroad, 
reliability being ensured through family solidarity.7 Ojala gives a 
comparable description for Finnish-European trade in the 18th century and 
Smith for the Anglo-American trade.8 
 Regarding the power of religious and ethnic communities, Price 
describes Quaker businesses in the 18th century Atlantic trade. 
Particularly significant was the extreme importance Quakers attributed to 
                                                 
7 Bratchel, M.E. (1996): Italian merchant organization and business relationships in 
early Tudor London, in Subrahmanyam, S. (Ed.): Merchant networks in the Early 
Modern world, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
8 Ojala, J. (1997): Approaching Europe: The merchant networks between Finland and 
Europe, European Review of Economic History 1: 323-353; Smith, S.(2006): Slavery, 
family, and gentry capitalism in the British Atlantic, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
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dependability and paying one's debts, even if legally charged bankrupt. 
Regular meetings of the Society on the local level addressed this issue 
frequently. Anyone who refused to pay his debts faced disownment.9 This 
is one of the few studies that give details on the mechanism of credit 
enforcement. 
 In non-European long distance trade, the growth of trade routes 
which went hand in hand with the expansion of Islam is significant. 
Muslim merchants migrated and brought the new faith and new 
commodities with them. Being part of this religious and ethnic minority 
enabled business relationships among the members. Preserving ties to 
the country of origin enabled long distance trade.  
 Bouchon and Risso describe the case of Muslim merchants from 
the Eastern coast of India exploring trading routes to Indonesia in the 15th 
century.10 They settled in Southeast Asian ports and organised trade 
through networks based on different congregations of Islam and local 
origin.11 
 Lovejoy describes a similar dynamic for the role of the Wangara in 
the economic transformation of early modern Sudan.12 
 Armenian merchants conducted trade from one end of the Eurasian 
continent to the other, making use of bills of exchange. Their network was 
based on unity by bonds of the Armenian nation and church.13 Hundert 
describes Eastern European Jewish networks in a similar way.14 
                                                 
9 Price, J.M./ Dunn, R.S. and Maples-Dunn, M. (Eds.) (1986): The great Quaker 
families of 18th century London, in The world of William Penn, Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press. 
10 Bouchon, G. (1999): Trade in the Indian Ocean at the dawn of the sixteenth century, 
in Chaudhury and Mornieau: Merchants, Companies and Trade, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p.43. 
11 Risso, Patricia (1995): Merchants and faith, Muslim commerce and culture in the 
Indian Ocean, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.43. 
12 Lovejoy, P.E. (1996): The role of the Wangara in the economic transformation of the 
Central Sudan in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in Subrahmayan, S. (Ed.): 
Merchant networks in the Early Modern world, Aldershot:  Ashgate Publishing Ltd, pp. 
29-50. 
13 Aghassian, M. And Keram, K. (1999): The Armenian merchant network: overall 
6 
 An example for a mix of family and ethnicity ties in long distance 
trade is that of Chinese merchant communities in Southeast Asia. Wang 
describes the development of the two largest of these communities from 
the Ming period onward, located in Manila and Nagasaki.15 Within these, 
the Hokkien were a minority group among the Chinese sojourners, 
coming from two coastal provinces of the empire and conducting trade 
with the home country, using loyalty based on the ties of family, village, 
and Hokkien identity.  
 The New Institutional approach to merchant networks is presented 
most importantly by Landa, Greif and North. Landa describes how 
Hokkien traders personalised exchange relationships lacking state 
contract enforcement. They used reciprocity to form social relationships 
and limit the costs of informal contract enforcement. Her work uses game 
theory supported by anthropological research on Hokkien merchant 
communities in Southeast Asia.16 
 In his case study of the medieval Maghribi traders, Greif argues 
that property rights enforcement was ensured through multilateral 
reputation mechanisms. The Maghribis formed a coalition, using only 
compatriots as agents, thus limiting membership of their network by local 
origin. Within this group, reputation mechanisms ensured the honesty and 
reliability of the traders. The prospect of future trade within the group 
maintained honesty and reliability among the agents, as continuous 
business relationships were more profitable than one-time cheating.  This 
                                                                                                                                               
autonomy and local integration, in Chaudhury and Morineau: Merchants, companies 
and trade, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
14 Hundert, G.D. (1996): The role of the Jews in commerce in Early Modern Poland-
Lithuania, in Subrahmayan, S. (Ed.): Merchant networks in the Early Modern world, 
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, pp. 247-279. 
15 Wang, G. (1990): Merchants without empire: The Hokkien soujourning communities, 
in Tracy, L. (Ed.): The rise of merchant empires, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp.400-423. 
16 Landa, J. (1981): A theory of the ethnically homogeneous middleman group: An 
institutional alternative to contract law, in: The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.10, No.2, 
June 1981. 
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enabled the use of credit and thereby long distance trade. At the same 
time, however, non-Maghribis, who did not rely on future trade with 
members of the community, had less incentive to be honest and where 
therefore not included. Greif argues that because of this membership in a 
merchant network is limited by ethnicity, religion, local origin or any other 
criteria that are not determined by the needs of trade. This constricted the 
market and thereby economic growth.17 Greif's work has however been 
criticised for relying too much on game theory and lacking empirical 
evidence for the existence of a coalition amongst the Maghribis. Edwards 
and Ogilvie argue that the Maghribis did in fact trade with non-
Maghribis.18 This claim furthermore supports the hypothesis for the 
efficiency of intercultural trade discussed later in this paper. 
North argues that the effort of keeping outsiders from participating in trade 
raised transaction costs, which hindered growth. The state taking over 
this role lowered transaction costs. This limitation was only overcome 
once the modern state developed, as it did in early modern Europe, and 
overtook the role of guaranteeing property rights. New institutions like 
joint stock companies, the Bank of England, and a more efficient judiciary 
lowered costs for individual merchants. This enabled highest possible 
participation in trade and market expansion, hence enabling the European 
economic take off. Voluntary organisations like merchant networks were 
not able to accomplish this on a similar scale as their membership and 
thereby their sphere of influence was restricted. 
 However, the new institutionalist approach fails to recognise that 
social relationships may develop beyond lines of religion, kinship or 
ethnicity. A network may therefore be able to extend further, thereby 
                                                 
17 Greif, A.(2005): Institutions and the path to the modern economy, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
18 Rowley, C.K. (2009): The curious citation practices of Avner Greif: Janet Landa 
comes to grief, Public Choice 140: pp.275-285; Edwards, J. And Ogilvie, S. (2008): 
Contract enforcement, institutions and social capital: the Maghribi traders 
reapproached, Working Paper, University of Cambridge. 
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overcoming the limitations of growth described by North. It may develop 
according to the needs of trade. That this has happened is, for instance, 
indicated by Latham's description of the expansion of the slave trade in 
West Africa, where an efficient multi-ethnic trading network including 
credit institutions developed, enabling the trading of slaves across long 
distances.19 
 This phenomenon of cross-cultural trade and the flexibility of 
communities' identities have not been sufficiently researched yet. 
However, communities' identities have been undergoing continuous 
change with regards to religious, political or social developments. This 
element of flexibility may have had an important impact on the 
possibilities to trade.  
This paper explores this topic using the case of a London merchant 
who was not a member of a marginalised community, yet had a network 
of trading partners of different backgrounds located in different parts of 
the world.  
 
 
3. The Source 
 This paper is based on one main source. This is a copybook of 
letters of the London merchant Michael Mitford. He was a merchant who 
specialised in the Baltic trade. He was born in the early 1650s in 
Newcastle.20 Which livery company he belonged to we do not know. From 
one of his letters we learn that he returned from Danzig around 1696. At 
the time, it was common for merchants' apprentices to spend several 
years abroad to acquire skills important to the trade, make contacts, and 
                                                 
19 Latham, A.J.H. (1973): Old Calabar, 1600-1891: The impact of the international 
economy upon a traditional society, Oxford: Calendron Press;  see as well Vanneste, 
Tijl (2009): A cross-cultural network of diamond traders: James Dormer (1708-1758) 
and his correspondents, WEHC, Utrecht. 
20 Ms Will of Michael Mitford, Public Records Office, The National Archives. 
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learn foreign languages.21 The census of the Inhabitants of London of 
1696 lists him as living in the parish of St. Dunstan in the East, being one 
of a limited number of citizens with an estate of £600 or more.22 Due to 
this, the fact that he was sole owner of several ships, as we learn from his 
letters, and the amount of property mentioned in his will, it appears that 
he was quite wealthy.23 Furthermore, he was related to landed gentry in 
Northumberland and through his apprentices, among them two Lowther 
sons, was connected to Parliament. 
 His correspondence appears to be in line with contemporary 
writings on how merchants ought to write letters, i.e. keeping contracts 
fairly open and trusting the correspondents to have good judgement and 
act in one's best interest.24 This means for instance not giving exact 
prices for which a contact ought to buy or sell the merchant's goods, as 
the contact will know the situation on the local market better. They also 
bear many similarities to the writings of other merchants of the era.25 
 The book contains 272 letters, covering the time period from 1703 
to 1707. The letters are addressed mainly to agents and business 
partners in different cities of Europe, mostly the Baltic. Most of them are 
written in English, but there are several in French and German as well. 
The frequency of letters decreases towards the end of the book, as trade 
was very slow and Mitford was kept busy with his office as a director of 
the East India Company. It is the only available source of information 
about his business, as no other papers, such as accounts, survive.  
 The letters give information on Mitford's views of current affairs, as 
                                                 
21 Gauci, P. (2001): The politics of trade. The overseas merchant in state and society, 
1660-1720, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.72. 
22 Glass, D.V. (Ed.): London inhabitants within the walls 1696, an index, London: 
London Record Society. 1966. 
23 Ms Letters of Michael Mitford, 8.11.1703 to Mr.Lounds, Esq., 3.2.1704 to Thomas 
Newman, 16.03.1705 to Lloyd & Dowker. 
24 Dafforne, R. (1635): The merchant's mirror, London; Cocker, Edward (1680, 9th 
edition): The young clerk's tutor enlarged, London. 
25 Sutherland, M.: A London merchant, 1695-1774, 1933. 
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far as they relate to his business interests. For instance he provided 
information about the debates in Parliament and how he expected the 
outcomes to affect trade. He wrote about the storm that hit Britain and the 
North Sea in the autumn of 1703, in which one of his ships was severely 
damaged. He also referred to the Great Northern War and that he 
expected England to become involved, which however did not happen. 
Finally the letters provide information on other peoples' businesses. 
 The information to be derived from the letters is selective and 
limited to what Mitford wanted his correspondents to know. Nor do we 
learn anything that would already have been known to them. For instance 
we do not learn the size of his property or the amount of money he made 
or lost. The letters do not contain any information that might have been 
contrary to the author's own interests. However, since being trusted by 
one's correspondents was vital in the business, we can assume that he 
was not lying, as being caught doing so could have seriously threatened 
his survival as a merchant. 
 Furthermore, the letters give little information about face-to-face 
dealings, for instance at the Exchange in London, as those did not need 
letters. We only learn about these if Mitford reported about them to one of 
his agents abroad. 
 What makes the letters a particularly interesting source, however, is 
that they reflect the development of the writer's social relationships with 
his correspondents. For long distance trade in this period, it was vital for 
agents to trust each other. Business success was therefore strongly 
dependent on social relationships.  The letters contain information about 
favours asked, debts forgiven, and the value attributed to friendship and 
family ties.  
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4. The Background 
 Three major events with possible effects on Mitford's trade fell into 
the period of the letter book. The first was the great storm that swept over 
England and parts of the Northern Seas in late 1703. Second was the 
Great Northern War, which raged across Northern Europe and especially 
the Baltic from 1700 to 1721. Third were the negotiations between the Old 
and New East India Companies on the subject of their merging. 
 In the night from November 26 to 27th  1703 „Horror and Confusion 
seiz'd upon all, whether on Shore or at Sea: No Pen can describe it, no 
Tongue can express it, no Thought conceive it“, as Daniel Defoe puts it in 
his report on the events, first published in 1704.26  It was a cyclone that 
hit Britain, coming from the Atlantic and moving on towards the North an
Baltic Seas, causing great destruction. It took approximately 8000 lives, 
including those of mariners in the navy and merchant vessels lost at sea 
that night. Defoe reports that at least 150 ships were lost
d 
                                                
27. In the 
aftermath of the storm, „almost all the shipping in England more or less 
out of repair, for there was very little Shipping in the Nation, but what had 
receiv'd some Damage or other“.28  
 We read about how Mitford and his correspondents were affected 
by the weather right at the beginning of the letter book, where concern is 
expressed „There are 60 Russia ships which we hear no news of pray 
god send them safe home“.29 At least one close contact - „we have heard 
nothing of Ladler, please God send him well home“- had gone missing.30 
Finally, one of Mitford's own three ships, the „3 Pilgrims“ „split her sails 
 
26 Defoe, D./ Hamblyn, R. (Ed.) (2003): The Storm, first published London 1704, 
London: Penguin Books Ltd., p.53. 
27 Ms Letters of Michael Mitford, 17.05.1704 to Punnet and Gilford 
28 Ibid. 30.05.1704 to Thomas Newman 
29 Ibid. 09.11.1703 to William Procter 
30 Ibid. 19.11.1703 to William Fenwick and 21.11.1703 to Lloyd & Dowker; see as well 
19.11.03 to Tuert Annes, 21.11.1703 to Van Drogenloft, 02.12.1703 to Jeremy Gregory, 
21.01.1704 to Hagdorn & Koomen, 01.02.1704 to Mallabar & Lowther 
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and damaged her rigging and other damages she has received by the 
late hurricane“.31 
 The Great Northern War marked the rise of Russia as a major 
European power, and the political decline of Sweden. Russia built a navy 
based in the Baltic and gained two Baltic provinces and several port cities 
from Sweden. Sweden in turn lost the German possessions it had gained 
in the 17th century. At that time Russia was allied with Denmark-Norway, 
Poland-Lithuania and Saxony.32  
 Mitford wrote to his apprentice David Otgher in Riga that he 
expected England to enter the war soon: „I'm afraid there will be a rupture 
between England and Sweeden for that King's proceedings begin to be 
obnoxcious in the eyes of our court. I believe that over long you'll hear 
that England and Holland will not only let loose the Dane upon him but 
also help his Danish Majesty against him“.33 However, this did not 
happen.  
 The war, in spite of seeing a significant increase of navies in the 
Baltic, seems to have had little negative effect on the safety of merchant 
vessels. The Scandinavian powers ensured the safe passage of foreign 
trading ships. In return, they collected tolls at the Sound. In his letters, 
Mitford did not complain about losing ships or experiencing any kind of 
harassment. Piracy in the North Sea and the English Channel did, 
however, necessitate armed convoys, a subject that will be dealt with 
below. A contributing factor to this development was the War of the 
Spanish Succession (1701-1713/14), one of the many battlegrounds of 
which was the North Sea. There was one factor that provided a severe 
challenge to Mitford's trade. The Swedish Tar Company decided to 
exclude English merchants from buying tar, and Mitford had great 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 01.02.1704 to George Mallabar 
32 Kirby, D. and Hinkkanen, M. (2000): The Baltic and the North Seas, London: 
Routledge, p.  123. 
33 Ms Letters of Michael Mitford, 07.03.1704 to David Otgher 
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difficulties obtaining any in spite of serious efforts. Tar was a war related 
material, and Sweden, due to the war situation, refused to allow its export 
by foreigners. This was likely as tar was used in the ship building industry, 
and Russia, in the beginning of the conflict, was building a new navy in 
the Baltic.34 
 Mitford and his correspondents in the Baltic showed little concern 
for their personal safety in spite of the increasing conflict. The English 
agents in Riga, Moscow and Danzig did not mention intentions of 
returning to England. Only in one letter, to Anthony Bothomly in Danzig, 
did Mitford mention that battle lines were moving closer to the 
correspondent's home, and expressed his hope that the friend may be 
safe and the conflict soon come to an end: „both she (A.B.'s mother) and 
your brother Gerard heartily wishes to see you in England. We all admire 
at your staying among the troubles in Poland where wee hear of nothing 
but fire and sword. God grant better times in that country“.35 Judging from 
the letter book, the conflict affected Mitford's business only regarding the 
purchase of tar, not otherwise.  
 From the 1690s onward, the East India Company had to struggle 
with an increasing rate of interloping in the trade with the subcontinent. 
Out of this developed the New East India Company. For a few years, the 
two companies existed side by side. Then negotiations were commenced 
in order to unite them, which ended in the creation of the United East 
India Company. The period of these negotiations corresponded with 
Mitford's directorship of the Old Company. The records of the Old 
Company regarding the negotiations mention some of Mitford's contacts. 
However, Mitford himself was not concerned with these negotiations, and 
                                                 
34 Kirby, D. and Hinkkanen, M.: The Baltic and the North Seas, London 2000, 
Routledge, p.127. 
35 Ms Letters of Michael Mitford, 05.05.1704 to Anthony Bothomly, see as well 
21.01.1703 to William Brown, 01.02.1704 to Mallabar & Lowther, 13.04.1705 to Lloyd & 
Dowker 
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even though they must have been significant for the Eastern trade, we 
find no mention of the developments in his letters.36 
 
 
5. The Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I: The Network was Based on Reputation and Reciprocity. 
 In a period that knew no efficient judiciary and when states had not 
the capacity to enforce property rights, a merchant had only his network 
to rely on. His membership in the network, and thus his success in long 
distance trade, depended on his reputation. A good reputation meant that 
the merchant could be trusted with others' goods and to repay credit. 
Greif describes how a reputation mechanism determined the conduct 
within a merchant community.37 
 Mitford's letters suggest that in his network such a reputation 
mechanism was in place. When distributing information about himself and 
others, Mitford pursued two goals.  First, he was concerned about his own 
credit rating.  
 Most of Mitford's letters refer to bills of exchange. Members of his 
network drew bills on each other. They informed each other that they had 
done so, and asked their trading partners to pay the money to the person 
the bill was made out for. Mitford was careful to ensure his 
correspondents of his own financial solvency.  
 For instance, he is the sole owner of the ship, the „3 Pilgrims“, 
which „has been this 18 ½ months in her Majesty's Transport Service 
both in Spain and the West Indies“. The transport office had not yet paid 
him the rent of £2800. He wrote to the office repeatedly, asking for his 
money. He pointed out that „I am the sole owner of the ship, which makes 
                                                 
36 Ms East India Company Court Book 1706, pp.2,14 
37 Greif, A. (2005): Institutions and the path to the modern economy, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
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my condition the worse“. Having to pay for reparations and the crew's 
wages put him in a financially difficult situation.38 
 Simultaneously, in letters to his agents he assured them of his 
confidence: „The payment of the government is very certain but the time 
when is also very uncertain and in the mean time the grass grows, the 
horse starves. However, I can get her into the Navy Service to be a 
Victualler or Store Ship and to be paid by that Office as the payment 
comes in Cours (...) I am offered £1000 from Mr. Knipe to go for Riga to 
load Mast and Hemp but my inclinations are for her to go to 
Archangele...“.39 This meant that there was no danger of him going out of 
business due to outstanding debts, and he seized the opportunity to point 
out the multiple business opportunities awaiting him in the future. 
 In another instance he informed several correspondents of a series 
of bankruptcies that had occurred among London merchants, and was 
careful to point out that these did not affect him: „John Du Maistre is 
indebted to them above £9000 for I see a list of his Creditors and their 
names was far above £9000...and I am very confident he will never be 
able to pay...I bless God I got clear of all these bankerupts, not concerned 
with any of them...“.40 
Second, he did unasked favours for his correspondents. He thereby 
placed them in his debt, hoping to be repaid in the future. This indicates 
that the network was based on reciprocity as well. 
  This occurred in two forms. First, he accepted agents' bills drawn 
on him, even if not consulted before hand. Without previous confirmation, 
the bills would usually have been sent back. This would have shed a 
negative light on the sender. Mitford paid these bills anyway: „I never had 
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orders from Mr. Procter to pay any such bill...however have accepted it 
for your honour“.41 In one instance he even pointed out what business 
opportunities his correspondent may have missed out on had Mitford not 
been so obliging: „I would not suffer your bills to go back with protest 
which might have been of very ill consequence to you in respect to the 
great favours you expect from his Czarish majesty“ and requested in 
return „the favour that as I have been soe kind and tender of your 
reputation in accepting your £1500 for your account that you take special 
care to remit your said £1500 with all possible care and speed to Messrs 
Chitty & St.Quentin of Amsterdam whatever loss may happen in your 
exchange or interest of money...“.42 
  Mitford further volunteered information about other merchants 
freely, for instance on the series of London bankruptcies. This was a 
favour to his correspondents, possibly saving them from losing money in 
those peoples' businesses. He reported what was officially the position of 
Du Maistre, who was charged bankrupt and the amount Du Maistre was 
still expected to pay. Mitford then gave his own take of the situation, 
which was worse: „he will never be able to pay“.43 Before this, Du Maistre 
was a frequent trading partner Mitford used to meet in the exchange. 
Apparently Mitford's loyalty ended with the bankruptcy and Du Maistre 
was excluded from the network. 
  Finally, Mitford informed Mr. Procter that a mutual contact was very 
upset about Procter's way of dealing with another merchant: „I was this 
day in company with Mr. Knipe who was making a very great complaint to 
me in relation to your fraighting Robert Baily for his accounts...but Baily is 
either naive or fool if not both. I don't remember ever to have seen Mr. 
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Knipe in such a passion for nothing would serve him but to send an 
action of 1000 against him...“. It was important for Mr. Procter to know 
about this, and be aware that Mr. Knipe may have caused him trouble or 
harmed his reputation. It is also interesting that Robert Baily was a 
frequent correspondent of Mitford's as well. Hence in addition to the 
service of informing Mr. Procter about this possible danger, Mitford also 
assured him of his loyalty, in spite Mr. Baily's importance to Mitford's 
trade. Surely he expected a similar conduct from Mr. Procter in turn. 
  Mitford also recommended his agents and their businesses to 
others, such as Mr. Martin, his partner in the wood trade: „I have written 
this day to Mr. Gregory and recommended your business to him“.44 To 
Robert Baily he wrote: „You do very well to employ Mr. Hardwick about 
your business with the widow Messenger, he is a stirring sort of a man 
that way and he may know her circumstances“.45 In turn, he received 
references and recommendations from his correspondents.46 
Simultaneously, he warned of traders he suspected of being dishonest: „I 
have just cause to believe that Mr. Camele has not dealt fairly by me, for 
because you recommended him to me was something free with him in 
talking to him. You expected £136 or £140 per tun for you brandy and I 
was informed that some of the distillers have given to £150 per tun and 
what can be the reason I cannot bring them to such a price I cannot tell, 
unless Camele has been consulting with them...“47 He indicated here as 
well that the correspondent was in his debt now, for giving such a bad 
recommendation. About Mr. Kemp he wrote: „... did not come for his 
freight which makes me think he has played some trick“.48 Finally he 
informed correspondents of his plans of resolving his partnership with Mr. 
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Martin „who I must say is so delatory in his accounts that I am quite 
weary of him...that I may break of our trading partnership with him as I 
see convenient for I find I do better by my self than with any assistance 
from him“.49 There is evidence for favours returned as well, as in a letter 
to Captain Thomas Newman in Shoreham: „I thank you for your advice 
about Messrs P & G: they are a little hasty upon me for moneys...“.50 
  Finally, he gave and received advice on whether to buy and sell 
goods, as in a letter to Mallabar: „As for salt at Newcastle it is so very 
dear I cannot advise you to be concerned there this year“.51 
  The reputation mechanism seems to have been fairly efficient, as 
the two incidences of cheating quoted above are the only ones in the 272 
letters. Reputation was the basis that made business between the agents 
possible at all. Reciprocity served as a tie that bound the agents together. 
As there is little evidence for cheating, this system seems to have been 
very efficient. The network was quite strong and succeeded in securing 
the members' property rights. 
 
Hypothesis II: The Values Attributed to Social Relationships 
Presented a Further Strengthening Factor in the Network. 
 The correspondents formed a social community as well as a 
business community.  In some cases the social ties preceded the 
business ties and provided an incentive to conduct trade with each other. 
In other cases, friendships developed out of business relationships and 
offered further support. Both were based on the same set of values or 
ethics. These included honesty, dependability, reciprocity, and 
responsibility. It further seems that expected reliability grew with the 
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closeness of social ties. These seem to have depended on both general 
values, such as kinship, and on individual's actions, as indicated in the 
chapter above.  
 Mitford's niece Mary, whose family lived in Newcastle, attended 
school in London, and stayed with Mitford and his wife during holidays.52 
They had taken responsibility for her and provided her with an allowance. 
She was expected to keep book about the money she received and pay it 
back later: „Her aunt makes Mally keep an Account of every perticular 
thing laid out for her for if that were not done she might forget hereafter 
her uncle and aunt and what we have done for her and would thinke it 
impossible if she did not keep an account herself of every penny. But she 
is a very good girl and I hope will answer expectation“.53 Mitford 
apparently had the same expectations of reciprocity in matters of family 
as in business. 
 In a letter to Mr. Hudson in Kingston, Jamaica, Mitford pointed out 
„your sister who is my good friend and neighbour takes a great deal of 
care and pains with your children“ and then gives information about a 
contact of the correspondent's, indicating that he may not be reliable „she 
fears you put too much confidence in a friend in Thames Street who of 
late hath met with an ugly blot in reputation...“.54 This contains three 
elements, the value of family ties, the value of friendship, and expected 
reciprocity for providing this information. The correspondent owed his 
sister a great deal. Mitford being a „great friend“ of the sister, and 
providing information, expected to profit from these relationships. 
 Furthermore, peoples' relationships towards one another, like family 
ties, were thought to reflect on the individual. This may have been 
because the correspondent was expected to act as a guarantor for his 
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contact in order to protect his own reputation, as in the case of Mr. 
Camele described above. 
 For instance in one letter Mitford apparently answered his 
correspondent's request for information about someone's dependability: 
„As to what you write about Mr. Samuel Woodsworth it is ten years since I 
left Dantzig and then he was but a young trader but know nothing of his 
circumstances but his brother here is a man of very good substance“, 
apparently indicating that this will shed a positive light on the brother.55 In 
addition, this „man of very good substance“, may have been expected to 
step in for his brother in case this one proved unreliable. Furthermore, 
there is a letter in which Mitford informed his correspondent of a 
bankruptcy, that of Ezekiel Hall, adding that the bankrupt merchant's 
brother, John Hall, „shall not pay anything of his brother's particular 
debts“.56 The Halls were at the time an important merchant family in the 
Atlantic trade.57 They were also Quakers who had a very good reputation 
concerning the payment of debts.58 Mitford's extensive discussion of the 
issue indicates that he expected the brother to act otherwise. Also, in a 
letter to John Delaval, Mitford mentioned finding his godson in a 
financially desolate situation, with nothing to eat, demanding that the 
boy's grandfather not take out his disagreements with the father on the 
children: „...but such was my affections and tenderness to his children 
when I found two of them here (Michael & Ralph) in such a deplorable 
condition that they had not six pence to buy them a dinner and I may be 
bold to say if I had not taken care of them they must have taken ill ...I 
hope he will consider this (...) that he'll in a speciall manner take care of 
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the education of his grandchild and my godson Michael Mitford pray profi 
him to promise it to you for althou the father might have offended him yest 
the innocent child is noe ways to blame...“.59 This indicates an 
understanding of responsibility for kin further than the nuclear family. 
 Finally, there is a letter of recommendation written by Urban Hall for 
Mitford to Lydder Flasting, the Burgermeister of Bergen, Norway. In this 
letter, Hall referred to Mitford as „my good friend...desiring to send his 
Ship the Mitford Castle... to your place to load Tarr and some 
Stockfish...he is a man of Honour and ability and you need not doubt but 
your bills drawn as he will direct by his laids commander Captain Thomas 
Linskill on him you laid Mr. Michael Mitford payable in kondon will be 
punctually and duely complyed“.60 This was meant to guarantee Mitford's 
trustworthiness and ethics, and therefore provide him with access to the 
Bergen market. 
 These instances indicate that certain behaviour was expected from 
relatives and friends, but also that they could not necessarily be counted 
on to be honoured. 
 There were institutions that were relied on in case no other 
guarantees were available, as indicated by a letter to Robert Fenwick in 
Newfoundland, in which Mitford commented about a business associate „I 
can see no remedy more that to refer it to his oath which he voluntarliy 
offers or to put it to a reference which will be very Tedious and 
Troublesome...“.61 The wording indicates reluctance to rely on this 
institution; apparently reputation and social ties were preferable means of 
guarantee.  
 The strength of these social relationships was flexible, determined 
by individuals' actions as well. This is supported by the way Mitford 
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addressed his correspondents. The titles ranged from „Sir“, to „my dear 
friend“ and „beloved cousin“.62 He did not address all his relatives as 
„beloved cousins“ – the term cousin being a general title for relatives at 
the time – only Robert Hewer and his nephew Henry Norris. However, his 
far more frequent correspondent William Procter, who is married to 
Mitford's cousin, was never addressed this way. He did address 
foreigners as dear friends, as in a letter to Francois Courtois: „mein guter 
alter bekannter Freund“.63 The titles are indications of the value of the 
relationship. That there is no pattern as to which titles he used for kin, 
compatriots, or  foreigners means that the strength of the social tie did not 
depend on criteria like nationality or kinship, but on reciprocity and 
friendship.  
 The importance of friendships is indicated in a letter to David 
Otgher, where Mitford asked Otgher to tell Courtois, that in spite of the 
money he owed the apprentice, „as I have been his friend so I may be 
again“.64 Or when writing to Mallabar and Lowther: „Pray tell Sarah 
Goldfinch that her husband is here and I have assisted him with money 
and clothes. He came from France without either and is now 
endeavouring by the first opportunity to come for Dantzig. He is pretty 
well recovered of his health and was with me the other day at 
Clapham“.65 
 There is a letter to Mitford's apprentice John Lowther, in Danzig, 
which helps illustrate the development of social relationships over time 
particularly well. This letter contains two interesting passages. First, 
Mitford refused to pay back the money he had received for the 
apprenticeship of John Lowther's brother Anthony, who recently passed 
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away while still indentured to him: „neither law nor custome can oblige me 
to return one penny of what received with your brother. The case was 
adjudged with Mr. Nesbitt and Mr. Barnadiston before the Chamberlain of 
London“. Second, it contains an answer to Lowther's worries about the 
latter's lack of success in business: „if you cannot earn your bread abroad 
I question if ever you will do so at home...for shame let it never be said 
that you can't earn your bread for if so you are a very silly idle fellow. 
Want you have bread brought to you and slapt into your mouth. Noe 
surely I hope you do not. You are in a wonderful country for bread and a 
dilligent man what will seeke it may find it. I thank god I found mine there 
and never had the tenth part of your estate from my parents to help me to 
it neither the advantage of any recommendation to be brought into a 
Comptoir or business to show me any way or method as you have had...“ 
After going on in a likewise manner for a while, he conceded, that if 
Lowther is „weary of your station you may come home to me again I have 
both bread for you to eat and work for you to doe, so long as you are 
under covenant with me I will perform the part of an honest master to 
you...“.66 Here there is an emphasis on the relationship between master 
and apprentice. In later letters he often sent the apprentices greetings 
from his wife.67 In one of Mitford's last letters, when his health was very 
poor and he spoke of retiring to the countryside, he ended with „I heartily 
wish you both all happiness this new year and remaine with kind respects 
and service your real Friend“.68 In his will he considered each of the 
apprentices with a small sum. The relationship seems to have become 
almost that of a father to his sons, and the apprentices were also his main 
correspondents, aside from relatives, in the period covered by the letter 
book.  
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 In one letter to Mallabar and Lowther, Mitford asked them to „bring 
me a good polish mitz & a knife & fork for carving with inlaid harth the 
costs shall thankfully repay you, your last Mitz I have worn until I am 
almost ashamed“.69 This was not business related and purely social, 
highlighting this aspect of the relationship. 
 These examples prove the complexity and importance of the social 
community. Individually developed ties of friendship substituted for ties of 
religion or kinship. This enabled the multiculturalism of the network. 
Furthermore, it makes it possible to argue, that the threat of ostracism 
likely functioned as a further strengthening element of the business 
network. 
 
Hypothesis III: The Network in the Baltic was not Limited by Local 
Origin, Religion or Ethnicity but Adapted to the Needs of Trade. 
Mitford's network was only partially based on the non-economically 
determined criteria the New Institutional Economists ascribe to voluntary 
organisations. Although it included kin, both in England and abroad, and 
most of its overseas trading partners were English, it was flexible and 
able to extend beyond these criteria. It included at least four different 
nationalities and religions. Among kin there were William Procter in 
Newcastle, Robert Hewer in Plymouth, and Mitford's nephew Henry 
Norris in Stockholm. There were contacts that were also from his home 
town Newcastle, such as the Fenwick brothers, Robert Baily, William Fell 
and William Aubone.70 Then there were his apprentices John Lowther, 
George Mallabar, and David Otgher, who were of mixed local 
background, albeit all English. He did business and maintained 
friendships with three Hall brothers, who were Quakers. Du Maistre was a 
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Huguenot, Nesbitt an Irishman and Catholic.71 To some of his contacts 
Mitford wrote in German, such as Jan and Peter van Tarelink in 
Amsterdam and Hagdorn & Koomen in Danzig.72 To Van Drogenhoft & 
Son he wrote in French, which means that they were foreigners.73 
Furthermore there was Francois Courtois, to whom he wrote in German, 
and whom he repeatedly called a „good friend“.74 Then there were Moses 
de Modena, who may have been Jewish, and Rodriguez Gomez, 
apparently a Spaniard.75 
 There is evidence that the members were willing to extend the 
network in order to facilitate trade opportunities, especially as „trade is 
very dead“,76 the main reason being that „This year the Tarr Company at 
Stockholm have played an adirly trick and our Government doeth hightly 
resent it for they would not sell one barrel to any English merchant but 
sent it for their own account and so we are obliged to give just what they 
please so that our L... must pay double for all the Tarr her actions require 
for this year...“.77 Consequentially, „our poor ropemakers are at a great 
nonplus for want of Tarr here in large quantities of Russia hemp laid up...“ 
and prices and possible profits were high.78 This further meant, that 
Mitford was unable to sell his or his contacts' substantial amounts of flax 
and complained that „this commodity has become such a rogue“.79 
Relative to tar the market was flooded with flax. As the two were required 
proportionally by rope makers, selling was not possible without 
substantial loss.  
                                                 
71 Gauci, P.: Merchant Database, Centre for Metropolitan History. 
72 Ms Letters of Michael Mitford, 21.04.04 to Van Tarelink and Hagdorn & Koomen 
73 Ibid. 01.02.1704 and 24.02.1704 to Van Drogenhoft & Son 
74 Ibid. 28.08.1704 to Francois Courtois 
75 Ibid. 21.01.1704 to Chitty & St.Quentin 
76 Ibid. 16.04.1705 to Lloyd & Dowker, see as well 06.03. 1705 to Mallabar & Lowther, 
03.06.1704 to Robert Hewer, 26.05.1704 to Lloyd & Dowker, 30.05.1704 to Samuel 
Martin, 03.02.1704 to William Procter  
77 Ibid. 21.01.1704 to Lloyd & Dowker 
78 Ibid. 21.01.1704 to Richard Greene 
79 Ibid. 12.02.1704 to William Procter 
26 
 Mitford managed to purchase some tar through his kinsman William 
Procter in Newcastle, however not sufficiently and he had to wait long 
before it was shipped.80 
 Mitford asked Mallabar and Lowther in Danzig, to „write to your 
correspondents at Elbing, Bromberg and Koenigsberg, Der Mamth, Der 
Liebau or Der Windau, Stolpe, Colberg, Stettin, or Stralsund to effect our 
commission for Tarr provided they can have this tarr for the carpenters 
and ropemakers“.81 He eventually wrote to his nephew and agent in 
Stockholm, Henry Norris, to „let me desire the favour of you if you can 
procure pitch or tarr especially the latter“ and advises him that „if the Tarr 
director will not let you have it you may order some Sweed to buy it and 
cosign it to me...“.82 There is no follow-up information provided, so we do 
not know if this venture was successful.  
 However, this incidence shows two things: the openness of the 
network, and the readiness to extend the network beyond lines of 
nationality and kinship if so required by trade.  
 Furthermore it is noteworthy that Mitford's most frequent 
correspondents in England were relatives. Procter was married to a 
cousin of Mitford's, and Hewer was always addressed as a cousin. In the 
Baltic, however, his most frequent correspondents were his apprentices, 
and the banking houses Chitty & St.Quentin in Amsterdam and Lloyd & 
Dowker in Moscow. The latter served only for money transfers. That the 
apprentices were the most frequent trading partners abroad may be 
interpreted as a dynamic element of the network already. Each apprentice 
had his own trading partners, independent from Mitford, in the Baltic area 
as well. This constituted an extension of the network in order to enable 
trade with other parts of Northern Europe. 
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 A reason for the openness of the network may have been the 
cosmopolitanism of the Baltic and North Sea region at the time. There 
was a certain cultural homogeneity, with most of Northern Europe being 
Protestant and speaking closely related languages, these being the 
Scandinavian languages, Dutch, German and English. Most of the 
literature on merchant networks considers such criteria as sufficient proof 
of values and ethics being common enough to build business 
relationships. 
 Furthermore, there were large expatriate communities of different 
nationalities all around the Baltic and North Sea due to the importance of 
trade and migration caused by religious persecution. This persecution 
affected Protestants, which had a positive impact on the similarly 
Protestant North Sea regions, which took in such refugees. This facilitated 
interregional and long distance trade and the diffusion of skills and 
commodities.83 
 Another point in case of this cosmopolitanism is Mitford's 
multilingualism. Judging from his letters it is clear that he spoke French 
and German well enough to conduct business in.84 Part of the reason 
apprentices were sent abroad for years as agents was to enable them to 
acquire foreign language skills which were meant to help them with their 
own businesses in future, thereby recognising the multiculturalism of their 
business environment.85 
 On the other hand, the lack of success shows the limits Mitford 
faced in trading without a diaspora based network. He was not a member 
of a transnational community, like that of the Jews or Armenians. He had 
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few relatives in the right places. Abroad there was only his nephew Norris 
in Stockholm, who served as a merchant's apprentice there, but however 
was not able to buy tar because of being English.86 If he had been part of 
a transnational religious community, with Swedish members as well, the 
Swedish ban would not have been a problem.  
 So there is evidence for the members' willingness to extend the 
network. The mechanisms of exclusion that Greif describes present no 
hindrance. However, there is no evidence of success of such efforts. The 
reasons for this were exterior to the network. In the case of tar they were 
the policies of a nation state.  This is not surprising in the age of 
mercantilism. Possibly, in the later period of free trade, Mitford's network 
may have been more successful. 
 The size of the market was therefore limited; the network was 
indeed not second best, but for other reasons than those proclaimed by 
the New Institutional Economists: it was not the merchants' concerns 
about free riders that limited the networks' willingness to expand, but 
barriers posed by the policies of a nation state. 
 
Hypothesis IV: The Trading Companies Played a Minor Role in 
Organising Their Members' Trade. 
 Mitford was a member of two trading companies, the Eastland 
Company and the Old East India Company. The Eastland Company was 
a regulated company. These companies were originally founded to 
establish a monopoly on the trade with a certain region. Membership in 
the company enabled merchants to participate in the trade with this 
region. This limitation was meant to make the risky business of long 
distance trade more attractive to merchants, ensuring higher profit 
margins. The companies further enjoyed political backing from the 
                                                 
86 Ms Letters to Michael Mitford: 01.01.1704 to Henry Norris; Ms Will of Margaret 
Mitford, Public Record Office, The National Archives 
29 
government, which was meant to support the interests of traders abroad. 
The New Institutional Economists argue that this was an important step in 
the building of European merchant empires and vital for their economic 
take-off. 
 In the letters, there is little evidence of the Eastland Company 
affecting Mitford's business on a day-to-day basis. He rarely referred to it. 
If company business took place face-to-face, there might not be much 
evidence in the letters. However, as he informed his agents abroad about 
all kinds of things regarding trade and politics, it could be expected that 
he informed those who were company members as well if there was 
anything of interest happening with the company. That he did not do so 
indicates that he was indeed hardly concerned with it in spite of the Baltic 
having been his main trading area. 
 It appears that Mitford acquired his agents in the Baltic from other 
sources, and not through the company. Some were from Newcastle, his 
home town, while others were relatives. Again others were foreigners, 
which would not have been members of an English company. The agents 
he most frequently corresponded with were his apprentices who 
functioned as agents in Danzig and Riga. Judging by his income and 
position in the East India Company, Mitford must have been well-known in 
London, and would have been approached about apprenticeships 
independently from his membership in the Eastland Company. 
 The Eastland Company is mentioned only regarding the securing of 
men-of-war from the admiralty for convoys of ships travelling to and from 
the Sound. In a letter to Captain Linskill of the „3 Pilgrims“, Mitford wrote 
that he „went up yesterday to the admiralty with some other merchants 
concerned with them and procured a grant of 2 men-of-war to carry such 
ships of their's and others as will go to winter at Archangel...“.87  
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 Apparently the Company served as a lobby to support the 
merchants' interests. A petition of Eastland Merchants to the Crown from 
1697 survives, in which the merchants, among them Mitford, requested 
the opening of the Russia trade. The Russia Company at this time had 
been reduced to very few members. The Eastland merchants argued that 
this situation was harmful to trade and nation, and succeeded. The 
Russia trade was opened the following year.88 According to the 
secondary literature, as diplomacy in Europe increased in the course 
the 17th century, the trading companies dealing with destinations on the 
continent, functions shifted from protecting merchants and their property 
abroad to lobbyism towards their own governments at home.
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 Mitford also owned stocks of the Old East India Company, as did 
several of his agents. In his letters, he informed them about the current 
value of their stocks.91 He further served as a director of the company 
from May 5th 1704 onwards.92 We do not know the amount of shares he 
owned. The board of directors met up to 100 times per year.93 In his 
letters, Mitford complained that work at Skinners Hall was very 
demanding, leaving him with little time for the Baltic business. The post 
came with a compensation of £150 per year. For a merchant of Mitford's 
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24.01.1707 to George Mallabar, 07.04.1704 to William Procter 
88 Astrom, S.E. (1963):  From cloth to iron: The Anglo-Baltic trade in the late 17th 
century. Part 1, The growth, structure and organisation of the trade, Helsingfors: 
Societas scientiarum Fennica, pp.183,193. 
89 Ibid. pp.180,198 
90 Ibid. p.165 
91 Ms Letters of Michael Mitford: 21.11.1703 to William Brown, 21.01.1404 to William 
Brown,  01.02.1704 to Anthony Bothomly, 31.03.1704 to Anthony Bothomly, 05.05.1704 
to Anthony Bothomly, 07.11.1704 to Mallabar & Lowther, 05.05.1704 to Anthony 
Bothomly, 30.05.1704 to Samuel Martin, 15.09.1704 to Mallabar & Lowther, 10.11.1704 
to William Brown 
92 Ibid. 05.05.1704 to Anthony Bothomly 
93 Ibid. 15.09.1704 to Mallabar & Lowther 
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calibre it seems doubtful that this would have been enough incentive to 
invest such an extensive amount of time. He obviously had a serious 
interest in the company's success. We can therefore assume that he must 
have owned a substantial amount of shares, in order to justify the effort.94  
 At the same time, however, his Baltic trade was very slow. He 
mentioned this repeatedly in his letters, and indeed bought and sold very 
little in the three years covered by the letter book. He was looking for 
other business opportunities. He traded a little with the West Indies and 
the Mediterranean. In Barbados and Jamaica, he sold some 
gunpowder.95 From Lisbon, he imported red wine.96 
                                                
 The notion that chartered companies were essential to facilitate 
trade is popular amongst historians and contemporaries. John Houghton 
in his paper „A collection for the improvement of husbandry and trade“ on 
Friday, January 10th and 17th  1696 described the advantages:  
 „If we trade to countries able to defend us, and that are governed 
by stated laws, as Spain, France, Holland, and such like, I think an open 
trade best; but where the governments are unable to defend us, and the 
rule is arbitrary as in Turkey and Russia, I am for a regulated company: 
For they must raise money for presents and several other occasions; but 
where they are absolut, divers, independent and not able to defend us, 
and we have principalities of our own, I see no way to manage but by a 
Joint Stock [...] Joint Stocks make great colonies, and have usually 
countries of their own to improve at pleasure, they have ships to offend or 
defend, they can spend every Farthing of the Stock they have, and gain 
credit for great sums more, they can make alliances...“97 
 
 
94 Ibid. 07.11.1704 to Mallabar & Lowther 
95 Ibid. 21.03.1704 to William Procter, 30.03.1704 to Hudson & Boyer 
96 Ibid. 19.07.1704 to Arthur Stern 
97  Houghton, John (Ed.): A collection for the improvement of husbandry and trade, 
10.01.1696 and 17.01.1696. 
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 However, we know that there was private trade with India. On the 
one hand, the company allowed its agents to conduct some private trade, 
in order to assure their loyalty.98 On the other hand, there was a lot of 
interloping. According to Chaudhury, whenever a private adventure to 
India was organised, it was very successful and reaped great profits.99 
Representatives of the Old Company claimed that this was due to the 
foundations laid by them. Furthermore, the increase of English piracy led 
to retribution by the Indian governments against English subjects and the 
company. Perhaps the independent trade/ piracy were in fact so 
successful that it threatened merely the interests of the company, not that 
of East Indian trade in general? This would be a point in case of network-
led trade and against the importance of the state, as it means that 
privately organised trade could be successful without intervention of the 
state. 
 Out of this interloping grew eventually the New East India 
Company.100 The negotiations between and the merging of the two 
companies fell into the period of Mitford's directorship. Contacts from his 
letter book were engaged in both companies.101 This might seem to be 
contrary to the proposed hypothesis. However, these contacts did not 
help him find agents in Asia. Hence it seems unlikely that they did so for 
Europe. This indicates that trade may have been as successful without 
the aid of chartered companies.  
 Finally, East Indian goods were very valuable, even a very small 
amount of spices would have brought a high profit margin. At one point, 
                                                 
98 Hejeebu, S. (2005): Contract enforcement in the English East India Company, The 
Journal of Economic History, 65 (2), pp.496-523. 
99 Chaudhury, K.N. (1978): The trading world of Asia and the English East India 
Company, 1660-1760, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., p.44. 
100 Lawson, P. (1993): The East India Company. A history, London: Longman, p.56. 
101 Ms East India Company Court Book 1706 
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Mitford forwarded „a small chist of East India goods“ to another merchant 
in the Baltic.102 
 It seems that Mitford would have had an interest in engaging in 
private trade with India. The above descriptions show that this was 
generally possible. That he does not do so, may indicate that he did not 
manage to acquire agents on the subcontinent. It seems that being an 
influential member of the East India Company did not help him. 
 To sum up, the case of the Baltic shows that trade was organised 
privately. The case of interloping in India shows that companies may not 
have been as essential for long-distance trade as generally assumed. 
The case of Russia shows that company monopolies could even be 
harmful to trade expansion.  
 In conclusion, this chapter has shown that while long-distance trade 
was not possible without merchant networks, the role of chartered 
companies may be overestimated. This indicates a greater importance of 
merchant networks relative to government backed companies than so far 
assumed. 
 
Hypothesis V: The Network Facilitated Trade Beyond the Reach of 
Political Institutions. 
 According to the New Institutional Economists, the state is a better 
protector of property rights than networks. The development of the nation 
state in the early modern period laid the foundation for the expansion of 
long distance trade and economic growth. Diplomacy grew in the 16th and 
17th centuries. States increasingly exchanged ambassadors and 
established consuls abroad. The Elizabethan consul in Istanbul, for 
instance, was a merchant himself. He was invested in his office in order 
                                                 
102 Ms Letters of Michael Mitford: 13.04.1705 to Chitty & St.Quentin 
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to supply more weight to his lobbying activities for English trade interests 
with the Porte.103  
 Thus, the growth of diplomacy and long distance trade went hand in 
hand, the former supporting the latter. 
 Mitford had connections to Parliament. He came from a landed 
gentry background, the Mitfords of Northumberland, and was related to 
Parliamentary representatives of the region.104 Two of his apprentices 
were sons of John Lowther, MP. Finally, there was his office in the East 
India Company, which might have supplied him with useful contacts as 
well. These should have been of use to his business. However they seem 
to have supplied little support to his interests, be it in acquiring the money 
owed to him by the transport office for his ship the „3 Pilgrims“, or in the 
Baltic trade. He tried desperately to buy tar, and the state did not support 
him in this. In his letters there is no indication that it even occurred to him 
to ask them for help.  
 As outlined in the previous chapter, the trading companies, which 
can be considered political institutions, did not provide Mitford with 
contacts or additional trading opportunities when needed. 
 Instead, it was his trading partners who brought Mitford into contact 
with political office holders in order to enhance his trading opportunities. 
For example contacts in Russia arranged contacts with Czarist 
government officials for him.105 
 Furthermore, Mitford's friend Urban Hall was personally acquainted 
with the mayor of Bergen and his direct recommendation enabled Mitford 
to trade there and acquire long sought-after pitch and tar, which was of 
great importance to his business. 
                                                 
103 Steensgaard, N. (1967): Consuls and nations in the Levant from 1570-1650, in: 
The Scandinavian Economic History Review 15 (2), pp.13-55. 
104 Burke, J. and Townsend, P. (Ed.) (1969): Burke's genealogical and heraldic history 
of the landed gentry, London: Burke's peerage limited, p.442-444. 
105 Ms Letters of Michael Mitford, 01.01.1704 to Lloyd & Dowker 
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The network here provided a service, that of providing contacts and 
trading opportunities, that the state did not. 
 
 
6. The Conclusion 
 The hypothesis of this paper is that Mitford's network was not 
inferior to the state in facilitating expansion of trade. The role of merchant 
networks in facilitating long-term economic growth may therefore have to 
be re-evaluated. The analysis of the letter book regarding the five minor 
hypotheses enables an evaluation of Mitford's network in this respect.  
 The first hypothesis argues convincingly that the network was 
based on a reputation mechanism. One of the main functions of the 
reputation mechanism was to share information about one's own and 
other agents' credit-worthiness. The letters provide ample evidence of 
information sharing, recommendations and warnings of agents.  
 It further became evident that the network used reciprocity to 
strengthen the business connections. The agents granted each other 
favours, particularly regarding the acceptance of bills of exchange without 
prior notification, and expected to be recompensated for these in the 
future. 
 The second hypothesis shows that business ties ran parallel to 
social ties. These either preceded the business interest, as in the case of 
kin, or developed over time. A common set of values shared by the 
network members and the threat of ostracism if an agent violated these 
values served to strengthen the network further. 
 The combination of these factors makes for an efficient mechanism 
to fend off free riders and secure property rights. This is further underlined 
by the fact that the letter book contains few references to instances of 
cheating. The ability of the network to combat the free riding problem 
efficiently leaves the question of its limitations. 
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 The third hypothesis argues that the network was not limited by 
non-economic criteria such as religion, local origin, or ethnicity, but 
adapted to the needs of trade. This point could be only partially verified. 
The network contained merchants of different backgrounds, most 
significant among them English, Irish, French, Spanish, Dutch, 
Huguenots, Quakers and Catholics. Furthermore, evidence was found 
that the network members were willing to extend their network and 
integrate further agents, regardless of their ethnic, religious, or cultural 
background. This becomes apparent in the members' Europe-wide quest 
for tar. However, their ambitions were of limited success. This was due to 
the policies of the Swedish Tarr Company, possibly connected to the 
Great Northern War. In this case, the nation state, contrary to what the 
New Institutional Economists propose, did not facilitate trade expansion, 
but hindered it.  
 A similar development is indicated by the limited role the chartered 
companies played in organising trade, as outlined in hypothesis IV. The 
Eastland and East India companies were of minor importance to Mitford's 
trade, which was almost entirely privately organised. Furthermore, the 
successful interloping in the East India trade indicates that the company, 
i.e. the state's involvement may not have been as fundamental for long-
distance trade as supposed. This notion receives further support from 
hypothesis V, which shows that connections of politicians and office 
holders played no role in Mitford's trade.  
Together these findings indicate that the role of the nation state 
compared to that of merchant networks for the expansion of long-distance 
trade is overestimated. The evidence is sufficient to argue that the role of 
merchant networks vis-a-vis nation states for the expansion of long 
distance trade must be re-evaluated. 
 As Mitford's network's success in expanding its trade was limited by 
exterior factors, it would be interesting to compare it with a network in the 
37 
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period of free trade. Also, Mitford's network comprised mostly people of a 
similar cultural background, as described above. An analysis of a more 
heterogeneous network, for instance one including indigenous and 
European merchants in intercontinental trade, would shed more light on 
networks' versus states' capacities in promoting trade. 
Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources: 
 
Cocker, Edward: The young clerk's tutor, 1668, British Library 
Defoe, Daniel: The compleat tradesman, London 1727, British Library 
Dafforne, Richard: The merchant's mirror, Edited by Bourne, Nicholas, 
London 1660 (1. edition 1635), British Library 
H.N.: The compleat tradesman, London 1684, British Library 
Houghton, John (Ed.): A collection for the improvement of husbandry and 
trade,  10.01.1696 and 17.01.1696, British Library 
Mitford, Margaret: Will, Public Record Office, The National Archives 
Mitford, Michael: Letter book, Guildhall Library 
Mitford, Michael: Will, Public Record Office, The National Archives 
Phillips, Henry: The purchaser's pattern, London 1654, British Library 
 
Published Primary Sources: 
 
Defoe, D./ Hamblyn, R. (Ed.) (2003): The Storm, first published London 
1704, London:  Penguin Books Ltd. 
Glass, D.V. (Ed.): London Inhabitants within the walls 1696, an index, 
London: London  Record Society, 1966. 
 
Monographs: 
 
Astrom, S.E. (1963): From cloth to iron: The Anglo-Baltic trade in the late 
17th century. Part 1, The growth, structure and organisation of the 
trade, Helsingfors: Societas scientiarum Fennica. 
Bin Wong, R. (1997): China transformed. Historical change and the limits 
of European experience, Ithaka: Cornell University Press. 
39 
Burke, J. and Townsend, P. (Ed.) (1969): Burke's genealogical and 
heraldic history of the landed gentry, London: Burke's peerage 
limited. 
Chaudhury, K.N. (1978): The trading world of Asia and the English East 
India Company, 1660-1760, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Gauci, P. (2001): The Politics of Trade. The Overseas Merchant in State 
and Society, 1660-1720, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Greif, A. (2005): Institutions and the path to the modern economy, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Kirby, D. and Hinkkanen, M. (2000): The Baltic and the North Seas, 
London: Routledge. 
Latham, A.J.H. (1973): Old Calabar, 1600-1891: The impact of the 
international economy upon a traditional society, Oxford: Calendron 
Press. 
Lawson, P. (1993): The East India Company. A history, London: Longman. 
North, D.C. and Thomas R.P. (1973): The rise of the Western world, 
London: Cambridge University Press. 
Olson, M.(1971): The logic of collective action. Public goods and the 
theory of groups, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press. 
Pomeranz, K. (2000): The great divergence. China, Europe, and the 
making of the modern world economy, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Risso, P. (1995): Merchants and Faith, Muslim Commerce and Culture in 
the Indian Ocean, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sutherland, M. (1933): A London Merchant, 1695-1774, London. 
van Lottum, J. (2007): Across the North Sea. The impact of the Dutch 
Republic on international labour migration, c. 1550-1850, 
Amsterdam. 
 
40 
Articles: 
 
Aghassian, M. and Keram, K. (1999): The Armenian merchant network: 
overall autonomy  and local integration, in: Chaudhury, S. and 
Morineau, M.: Merchants, companies and trade, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp.74-95. 
Bouchon, G. (1999): Trade in the Indian Ocean at the dawn of the 
sixteenth century, in Chaudhury, S. and Mornieau, M.: Merchants, 
Companies and Trade, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp.42-55. 
Bratchel, M.E. (1996): Italian Merchant Organization and Business 
Relationships in Early Tudor London, in Subrahmanyam, S. (Ed.): 
Merchant Networks in the Early Modern World, Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, pp.1-29. 
Hejeebu, S. (2005): Contract enforcement in the English East India 
Company, in: The Journal of Economic History, 65 (2), pp.496-523. 
Hundert, G.D. (1996): The Role of the Jews in Commerce in Early Modern 
Poland-Lithuania, in: Subrahmayan, S. (Ed.): Merchant Networks in 
the Early Modern World, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, pp. 
247-279. 
Landa, J. (1981): A theory of the ethnically homogeneous middleman 
group: An institutional alternative to contract law, in: The Journal of 
Legal Studies, Vol.10, No.2, June 1981. 
Lovejoy, P. E. (1996): The Role of the Wangara in the Economic 
Transformation of the Central Sudan in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth 
Centuries, in: Subrahmayan, S. (Ed.): Merchant Networks in the 
Early Modern World, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, pp. 29-50. 
North, D.C. (1991): Institutions, Transaction Costs, and the Rise of 
Merchant Empires, in Tracy, J.: The Political Economy of merchant 
Empires, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.22-40. 
41 
Ojala, J. (1997): Approaching Europe: The merchant networks between 
Finland and Europe, European Review of Economic History 1, 
pp.323-353. 
Price, J.M. (1991): Transaction costs: A note on merchant credit and the 
organization of private trade, in Tracy, L. (Ed.): The Political 
Economy of Merchant Empires, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp.276-297. 
Price, J.M./ Dunn, R.S. and Maples Dunn, M. (Eds.) (1986): The great 
Quaker families of 18th century London, in The world of William 
Penn, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Steensgaard, N. (1967): Consuls and nations in the Levant from 1570-
1650, in: The Scandinavian Economic History Review 15 (2), 
pp.13-55. 
Vries, P. (2002): Governing Growth: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of 
the State in the Rise of the West, Journal of World History, 13, 
Honululu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 67-138. 
Wang, G. (1990): Merchants without empire: The Hokkien soujourning 
communities, in Tracy, L. (Ed.): The Rise of Merchant Empires, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.400-423. 
 
Online materials: 
 
C.K. Rowley (2009): The curious citation practices of Avner Greif: Janet 
Landa comes to grief, public Choice 140: pp.275-285, 14.08.2009 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/q6pq851k12738423/fulltext.pdf 
Vanneste, T.: A cross-cultural network of diamond traders: James Dormer 
(1708-1758) and his correspondents, XVth World Economic History 
Congress, Utrecht 2009, Working Paper, 14.08.2009 
http://www.wehc2009.org/programme.asp?find=vanneste 
Edwards, J. and Ogilvie, S. (2008): Contract enforcement, institutions and 
42 
43 
social capital: the Maghribi traders reappraised, (Working Paper), 
University of Cambridge, 14.08.2009 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/q6pq851k12738423/fulltext.pdf 
Gauci, P.: Merchant database, Centre for Metropolitan History. 
 
 Appendix I: Table of correspondence 
 
Name Location Relation Dates Title Notes 
Tyeert Annes Yarmouth Shipper 9.12.03 none  
Anne Atmar   19.8.04   
William Aubone Newcastle  11.4.04 Sir  
William Bourne    5.5.04 Sir  
Booth & Bernardiston   3.1.07   
Anthony Bothomly Danzig  31.3.04; 5.5.04; 12.5.04 Sir  
Henry Bland   29.5.04 Sir Son of Susanna Bland 
Susanna Bland Danzig  25.4.04 Madam  Mother of Henry Bland 
Bartholomy Bloodsworth   1.2.04; 7.3.04; 2.5.04; 7.11.04   
William Browne Danzig  21.12.03; 10.10.04 Sir East India Stocks Info 
Robert Baily Newcastle  10.2.04; 17.2.04; 23.2.04; 29.2.04; 
7.03.04; 16.3.04; 23.3.04 
Sir  
William Brown Danzig  21.1.04 none  
Anthony Bothomley Danzig  1.2.04 Sir  
Francois Courtois   25.8.04 Mein guter & 
alter bekannter 
freund – my 
good old friend 
German 
Chitty & St.Quentin Amsterdam  14.12.03; 21.12.03; 21.12.03; 
21.1.04; 25.2.04; 1.2.04; 11.2.04; 
7.2.04; 31.3.04; 2.5.04; 12.5.04; 
20.6.04; 25.8.04; 5.9.04; 7.11.04; 
23.2.05; 2.3.05; 13.4.05; 4.2.07 
Gentlemen Bank 
Dirk Deuries   5.9.04 Sir Friend of Mr.Knipe 
John Delaval Northamptonshire Kinsman? 1.8.04  Mention of godson 
Michael Mitford and his 
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brother Ralph; ship 
„Mitford Castle“ 
Dodgson & Dixon Leeds  3.2.04; 10.2.04; 19.2.04; 7.3.04; 
11.3.04 (twice); 25.8.04 
Sirs  
William Fenwick Hull  19.12.03; 15.1.04; 18.1.04; 3.2.04; 
10.2.04; 19.2.04; 7.3.04; 11.3.04; 
22.3.04; 25.2.04; 2.5.04; 11.7.04; 
1.8.04; 5.9.04; 26.9.04; 3.10.04; 
21.10.04; 7.11.04; 16.11.04; 
27.2.05; 6.3.05; 18.2.07 
Sir  
Robert Fenwick Newcastle  21.12.03; 2.12.03; 17.2.04   
William Fenwick   2.11.04 Sir  
Nicholas Fenwick, Jr Newcastle    Fenwick Brother 
R.Fenwick & Nicholas Ridley Newcastle  6.4.04   
Lydder Flasting   31.8.06 (2) Sir Mayor of Bergen, 
Urban Hall's reference 
and Mitford's letter 
Christian Fuxen ?  20.6.04 Sir  
Jeremy Gregory Chatham  14.12.03; 30.12.03; 2.12.03; 
21.12.03; 23.2.03; 25.3.04 
Sir  
Richard Greene Koenigsberg  21.1.04; 1.2.04; 7.2.04; 20.6.04; 
7.11.04; 13.4.04 
Sir  
Edward Harman Portsmouth  9.12.03; 30.12.03; 13.1.04 Sir  
Robert Hewer Plymouth  11.12.03; 4.1.04; 11.1.04; 13.1.04; 
20.1.04; 27.1.04; 1.2.04; 10.2.04; 
17.2.04; 29.2.04; 11.03.04; 
25.3.04; 4.4.04; 11.4.04; 20.4.04; 
27.4.04; 9.5.04; 18.5.04; 3.6.04; 
15.6.04; 15.6.04; 20.6.04; 24.6.04; 
8.7.04; 15.7.04; 18.7.04; 20.7.04; 
Sir and Loving 
Cousin 
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1.8.04; 5.8.04; 10.8.04; 15.8.04; 
19.8.04; 21.9.04; 10.10.04; 
14.10.04; 2.11.04; 11.11.04; 
16.11.04; 30.11.04; 2.12.04; 
5.12.04; 15.2.05; 20.2.05; 1.3.05; 
10.3.05; 5.9.06; 27.12.06 
Christian Hewer   18.11.04   
Hagdorn & Koomen Danzig  21.1.04 none in German 
Hudson & Bowyer Kingston, Jamaica  22.3.04; 30.3.04; 29.6.04; 30.11.04 none  
Jonathan Hutchinson   25.9.04 Sir  
Thomas Linskill   18.4.04; 15.8.04; 16.11.04; 
21.11.04; 31.8.06 
none Captain, en route to 
Norway to purchase 
tar 
Lloyd & Dowker Moscow  21.12.03; 21.1.04; 25.2.04; 7.3.04; 
26.5.04; 16.4.05 
Gentlemen bank 
John Lowther Danzig Apprentice 21.12.03; 31.3.04 Sir  
George Mallabar Danzig Apprentice 1.2.04; 9.3.05; 3.1.07 Sir  
Madame Mallabar   16.11.04  Mother of George 
Mallabar? 
Mallabar & Lowther Danzig Apprentices 21.1.04; 1.2.04; 11.2.04; 31.3.04; 
15.9.04; 7.11.04; 23.2.05; 2.3.05; 
6.3.05; 13.4.05; 4.2.07 
Gentlemen  
Peter Martin   Partner in 
Wood Trade 
14.12.03; 2.12.03 Sir  
Samuel Martin   30.5.04 Sir  
Mother Newcastle  30.5.04 Honourable 
Mother 
 
Thomas Newman Shoreham, Sussex Shipbuilder 3.2.04; 5.2.04; 16.3.04; 30.3.04 Sir Mention of „my ship 
Josephine“ 
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Mary Newman   21.9.04  Wife of Thomas 
Newman 
Henry Norris Stockholm Nephew, see 
will 
1.2.04 Beloving 
Cousin 
 
David Otgher Riga Apprentice, 
see will 
7.3.04; 5.5.04; 25.8.04; 13.4.05 Sir  
Punnett & Gilford  Shipbuilders 30.12.03; 15.6.04 none  
David Punnett & Henry 
Guilford 
Shoreham, Sussex  29.2.04; 7.3.04; 23.3.04; 30.3.04; 
13.5.04 
  
William Phipard   12.9.04; 21.9.04; 26.9.04; 5.10.04   
William Procter Newcastle In-law, married 
to a cousin 
07.11.03; 09.11.03; 11.11.03; 
18.11.03; 30.11.03; 01.01.03; 
11.01.04; 13.01.04; 03.02.04; 
12.02.04; 17.02.04; 24.02.04; 
29.02.04; 07.03.04; 11.03.04; 
21.03.04; 20.04.04; 07.04.04; 
02.05.04; 09.05.04; 21.05.04; 
10.04.04; 08.06.04; 18.07.04; 
01.08.04; 10.08.04; 26.11.04; 
28.11.04; 03.12.04; 10.12.04; 
19.12.04; 03.03.05; 31.08.06 
  
William Ramsay   25.9.04 Sir  
Nathaniel Remington Hamburg  14.12.03 Sir  
Robert Scrutton   9.12.03 Sir  
Arthur Stern Lisbon  19.7.04; 14.11.04 Sir Wine merchant 
Charles Smithson   20.7.04; 31.8.04; 12.9.04 none Captain 
Van Drogenloft & Son Amsterdam  21.12.03 none Informs about Tyeert 
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Annes lost ship 
Jan & Peter Van Tarelink Amsterdam  21.1.04 none German 
Vandroogenhoft & Son Amsterdam  1.2.04; 24.2.04 Messieurs French 
Joseph Watsworth   5.9.04 none  
Mr. Walker Tower Hill Transport 
office 
21.2.04 Sir Complaint about 
outstanding fees of 3 
Pilgrims 
Sister Webster Newcastle Sister 21.12.03; 20.7.04; 5.8.04 Sister Webster Mary's mother, 
enclosed bill on 
Mr.Procter 
 
 
Approximately 140 additional names are mentioned in the letters. 
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